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Q-Learning in Regularized Mean-field Games
Berkay Anahtarcı, Can Deha Karıksız, and Naci Saldi
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a regularized mean-field
game and study learning of this game under an infinite-horizon
discounted reward function. The game is defined by adding a
regularization function to the one-stage reward function in the
classical mean-field game model. We establish a value iteration
based learning algorithm to this regularized mean-field game
using fitted Q-learning. This regularization term in general makes
reinforcement learning algorithm more robust with improved
exploration. Moreover, it enables us to establish error analysis
of the learning algorithm without imposing restrictive convexity
assumptions on the system components, which are needed in the
absence of a regularization term.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the learning of regularized mean-
field games (MFGs) under infinite-horizon discounted reward
function. In this game model, a single agent interacts with
a huge population of other agents and compete with the
collective behaviour of them through a mean-field term which
converges to the distribution of a single generic agent, as the
number of agents is being let go to infinity. In the limiting
case, therefore, a generic agent faces a single-agent stochastic
control problem with a constraint on the state distribution at
each time. This condition specifies that the state distribution
should be consistent with the behaviour of the total population.
In other words, at each time step, the resulting distribution of
the state of each agent is the same as the flow of the state
distribution when the generic agent applies this policy. This
stability condition between policy and state distribution flow
is called the mean-field equilibrium.
The theory of MFGs has emerged in the work of Lasry and
Lions [1] where the standard terminology of mean-field games
was introduced, and independently as stochastic dynamic
games by Huang, Malhamé and Caines [2]. They have both
considered continuous time non-cooperative differential games
with large but finite number of asymptotically negligible
anonymous agents in interaction along with their infinite limits
to establish approximate Nash equilibria. In continuous-time
differential games, characterization of the mean-field equi-
librium is given by coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation and Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (FPK) equation. We
refer the reader to [3]–[10] for studies of continuous-time
mean-field games with different models and cost functions,
such as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games,
games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
In comparison with continuous-time framework, there are
relatively less results available on discrete-time mean-field
games in the literature. These works have mainly studied the
setting where the state space is discrete (finite or countable)
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and the agents are only coupled by their cost functions; that
is, the mean-field term does not influence the evolution of
the agents’ states. In [11], a mean-field game model with
finite state is studied, and [12] considers discrete-time mean-
field games with an infinite-horizon discounted cost criterion
over unbounded state spaces. Discrete-time mean-field games
with linear state dynamics are studied in [13]–[16]. References
[17]–[20] study discrete-time mean-field games subject to the
average cost optimality criterion. In [21], authors consider a
discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field game with Polish state
and action spaces. References [22], [23] consider a discrete-
time mean-field game with Polish state and action spaces under
the discounted cost optimality criterion for both fully-observed
case and partially-observed case, respectively.
We note that the aforementioned papers, except linear mod-
els, mostly identify the existence of mean-field equilibrium and
no algorithm with convergence guarantee has been proposed to
compute this mean-field equilibrium. In our recent work [24],
this problem is explored for mean-field games with abstract
state and action spaces under both discounted cost and average
cost criteria. We have developed a value iteration algorithm
and proved that this algorithm converges to the mean-field
equilibrium. In [25], we generalize this value iteration algo-
rithm to the model-free setting using fitted Q-learning [26].
There, fitted Q-learning is used instead of classical Q-learning
algorithm because the action space is assumed to be a compact
and convex subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. In
this work, we generalize this work to the regularized mean-
field games.
In misspecified control models, greedy algorithms often
results in policies that are far from optimal. Making use of
regularization provides a way to overcome this problem. Most
recent reinforcement algorithms also use regularization to
increase exploration and robustness, and this regularization is
generally established via entropy or relative entropy. We refer
the reader to [27] for an exhaustive review of the literature
on regularized Markov decision processes (MDPs) and [28]
for a general framework on entropy-regularized MDPs. In this
paper, we introduce regularized mean-field games, analogous
to regularized MDPs. Our research seems to be the first one
studying this problem. We propose a learning algorithm to
compute an equilibrium solution for discrete-time regularized
mean-field games under the discounted reward optimality
criterion. A regularization term is added to the one-stage
reward function in this game model. This is supposed to
improve the algorithm’s exploration and make algorithm more
robust. Moreover, due to regularization term, an error analysis
of the learning algorithm can be established under quite mild
assumptions as opposed to the classical case. In the latter case,
we need restrictive convexity conditions.
In the literature, the existence of mean-field equilibria has
2been established for discrete-time mean-field games under
the discounted optimality criterion in [22]. However, learning
discrete-time mean-field games has not been studied much,
even for the classical case, until recently. In [29], authors
establish a Q-learning algorithm to compute approximate
mean-field equilibria for finite state-action mean-field games.
The analysis of convergence of the learning algorithm in
this work is highly dependent upon the assumption that the
operators in the algorithm are contractive. However, proving
the contractive property of these operators is highly non-trivial
and requires sophisticated convex analytic tools. Therefore,
it is not judicious to state this as an assumption. In [30],
authors develop a fictitious play iterative learning algorithm
for mean-field games with compact state and action spaces,
where the dynamics of the state and the one-stage cost function
satisfy certain structure. They suggest an error analysis of
the learning algorithm for the deterministic game model (no
noise term in the state dynamics). Nevertheless, they do not
identify the conditions on the system components for which
the error bound between learned equilibrium and mean-field
equilibrium converges to zero. In [31] authors study linear-
quadratic mean-field games and establish the convergence of
policy gradient algorithm. In [32], an actor-critic algorithm to
learn mean-field equilibrium for linear-quadratic mean-field
games is developed. In [33] a mean-field game in which
agents can control their transition probabilities without any
restriction is studied. In this case, the action space becomes
the set of probability measures on the state space. With
this specific model, they can transform a mean-field game
into an equivalent deterministic Markov decision processes
by extending the state and action spaces, and so, establish
classical reinforcement learning algorithms to compute mean-
field equilibrium.
In this paper, we consider a regularized discrete-time mean-
field game with finite state and action spaces under infinite-
horizon discounted reward. We introduce regularization as an
additive term to the one-stage reward function. We establish
a value iteration based learning algorithm to this regularized
mean-field game using fitted Q-learning. This regularization
term in general makes the learning algorithm more robust
with improved exploration. Moreover, it enables us to establish
error analysis of the learning algorithm without imposing
restrictive convexity assumptions on the system components,
which are needed in the absence of a regularization term.
The paper is set out as follows. In Section II, we introduce
classical and regularized mean-field games as well as finite-
agent game, and define the classical and regularized mean-field
equilibria. In Section III, we define mean-field equilibrium
operator and show that the mean-field equilibrium operator is
contractive. In Section IV, we establish a Q-learning algorithm
to compute approximate regularized-mean-field equilibrium
and prove its convergence. Section V concludes the paper.
Notation. For a finite set E, we let P(E) denote the
set of all probability distributions on E. In this paper,
‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖2 denote l1-norm and l2-norm on P(E),
respectively. Total variation norm on P(E) is denoted
by ‖ · ‖TV . For any µ, ν ∈ P(E), we have ‖µ −
ν‖TV = inf
{
ξ(1{x 6=y}) : ξ(·,E) = µ(·) and ξ(E, ·) = ν(·)
}
and the distribution ξ on E × E that achieves this infimum is
called optimal coupling between µ and ν. It is known that
‖ · ‖1 = 2 ‖ · ‖TV . In this paper, we will always endow
P(E) with l1-norm. For any e ∈ E, δe is the Dirac delta
distribution. We let m(·) denote the Lebesgue measure on
appropriate finite dimensional Euclidean space Rd. For any
a ∈ Rd and ρ > 0, let B(a, ρ) := {b : ‖a − b‖1 ≤ ρ}.
For any a, b ∈ Rd, 〈a, b〉 denotes the inner product. Let
Q : E1 × E2 → R, where E1 and E2 are two sets. Then, we
defineQmax(e1) := supe2∈E2 Q(e1, e2). For any function class
G, let VG denote its pseudo-dimension. The notation v ∼ ν
means that the random element v has distribution ν.
II. MEAN-FIELD GAMES
A discrete-time mean-field game is specified by
(X,A, p, r) ,
where X is the finite state space and A is the finite action
space. The components p : X × A × P(X) → P(X) and
r : X × A × P(X) → [0,∞) are the transition probability
and the one-stage reward function, respectively. Therefore,
given current state x(t), action a(t), and state-measure µ, the
reward r(x(t), a(t), µ) is received immediately, and the next
state x(t+1) evolves to a new state probabilistically according
to the following distribution:
x(t+ 1) ∼ p(·|x(t), a(t), µ).
To complete the description of the model dynamics, we should
also specify how the agent selects its action. To that end, a
policy π is a conditional distribution on A given X; that is,
π : X→ P(A). Let Π denote the set of all policies.
In mean-field games, a state-measure µ ∈ P(X) represents
the collective behavior of the other agents; that is, µ can be
considered as the infinite population limit of the empirical
distribution of the states of other agents. Given any state-
measure µ ∈ P(X), a policy π∗ ∈ Π is optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = sup
pi∈Π
Jµ(π),
where
Jµ(π) = E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtr(x(t), a(t), µ)
]
is the discounted reward of policy π under the state-measure
µ and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Given µ, the states and
actions are evolved as follows:
x(0) ∼ µ0, x(t) ∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µ), t ≥ 1,
a(t) ∼ π( · |x(t)), t ≥ 0,
where µ0 denotes the initial distribution of the state.
In this paper, we impose the following assumptions on the
system components.
Assumption 1.
(a) The one-stage reward function r satisfies the following
Lipschitz bound:
|r(x, a, µ) − r(xˆ, aˆ, µˆ)|
3≤ L1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + 1{a 6=aˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
, ∀x, xˆ, ∀a, aˆ, ∀µ, µˆ.
(b) The stochastic kernel p( · |x, a, µ) satisfies the following
Lipschitz bound:
‖p(·|x, a, µ)− p(·|xˆ, aˆ, µˆ)‖1
≤ K1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + 2 · 1{a 6=aˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
, ∀x, xˆ, ∀a, aˆ, ∀µ, µˆ.
Note that we can equivalently describe the model above
as follows. In this equivalent model, we take action space
to be the set of probability measures U := P(A) on the
original action space A. Hence, the new action space U is
an uncountable, convex, and compact subset of RA with
dimension |A| − 1. With this new action space, the new
transition probability P : X × U × P(X) → P(X) and the
new one-stage reward function R : X × U × P(X) → R are
defined as follows:
P ( · |x, u, µ) :=
∑
a∈A
p( · |x, a, µ)u(a),
R(x, u, µ) :=
∑
a∈A
r(x, a, µ)u(a).
In this equivalent model, a policy π is a deterministic function
from state space X to the new action space U. Therefore, for
a fixed µ, the reward function of any policy π is given by
Jµ(π) = E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtR(x(t), u(t), µ)
]
,
where
x(0) ∼ µ0, x(t) ∼ P ( · |x(t− 1), u(t− 1), µ), t ≥ 1,
u(t) = π(x(t)), t ≥ 0.
In the remainder of this paper, we replace the original mean-
field game model with this equivalent one. We prove below
the conditions satisfied by the new transition probability P
and one-stage reward function R under Assumption 1.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, P and R satisfy the
following Lipschitz bounds:
|R(x, u, µ)−R(xˆ, uˆ, µˆ)|
≤ L1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖u− uˆ‖1 + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
, ∀x, xˆ, ∀u, uˆ, ∀µ, µˆ.
and
‖P (·|x, u, µ)− P (·|xˆ, uˆ, µˆ)‖1
≤ K1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖u− uˆ‖1 + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
, ∀x, xˆ, ∀u, uˆ, ∀µ, µˆ.
Proof. Fix any x, xˆ, u, uˆ, µ, µˆ. Then we have
|R(x, u, µ)−R(xˆ, uˆ, µˆ)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
r(x, a, µ)u(a) −
∑
aˆ∈A
r(xˆ, a, µˆ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
r(x, a, µ)u(a) −
∑
aˆ∈A
r(x, a, µ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
r(x, a, µ) uˆ(a)−
∑
aˆ∈A
r(xˆ, a, µˆ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ L1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖u− uˆ‖1 + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
.
Similarly, we have
‖P (·|x, u, µ)− P (·|xˆ, uˆ, µˆ)‖1
=
∑
y∈X
|P (y|x, u, µ)− P (y|xˆ, uˆ, µˆ)|
=
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ)u(a)−
∑
a∈A
p(y|xˆ, a, µˆ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ)u(a)−
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ) uˆ(a)−
∑
a∈A
p(y|xˆ, a, µˆ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤ K1‖u− uˆ‖1
+
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ) uˆ(a)−
∑
a∈A
p(y|xˆ, a, µˆ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ K1
(
1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖u− uˆ‖1 + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
.
To show that (1) follows from Assumption 1-(b), let us define
the transition probability M : A→ P(X) as
M(·|a) := p(·|x, a, µ).
Let ξ ∈ P(A × A) be the optimal coupling of u and uˆ that
achieves total variation distance ‖u− uˆ‖TV . Similarly, for any
a, aˆ ∈ A, let K(·|a, aˆ) ∈ P(X × X) be the optimal coupling
of M(·|a) and M(·|aˆ) that achieves total variation distance
‖M(·|a)−M(·|aˆ)‖TV . Note that
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ)u(a)−
∑
a∈A
p(y|x, a, µ) uˆ(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
= 2‖uM − uˆM‖TV ,
where
uM(·) :=
∑
a∈A
M(·|a)u(a)
and
uˆM(·) :=
∑
a∈A
M(·|a) uˆ(a).
Let us define ν(·) := ∑(a,aˆ)A×AK(·|a, aˆ) ξ(a, aˆ), and so, ν
is a coupling of uM and uˆM . Therefore, we have
2 ‖uM−uˆM‖TV ≤ 2
∑
(x,y)∈X×X
1{x 6=y} ν(x, y)
= 2
∑
(a,aˆ)∈A×A
∑
(x,y)∈X×X
1{x 6=y}K(x, y|a, aˆ) ξ(a, aˆ)
=
∑
(a,aˆ)∈A×A
‖M(·|a)−M(·|aˆ)‖1 ξ(a, aˆ)
≤ 2K1
∑
(a,aˆ)∈A×A
1{a 6=aˆ} ξ(a, aˆ)
= K1 ‖u− uˆ‖1.
Hence, (1) follows. This completes the proof.
4Now, we can define the optimality criteria of the model. To
this end, we need to define two set-valued mappings. The first
set-valued mapping Ψ : P(X)→ 2Π is defined as follows:
Ψ(µ) = {πˆ ∈ Π : Jµ(πˆ) = sup
pi
Jµ(π) and µ0 = µ}.
The set Ψ(µ) is the set of optimal policies for µ when the
initial distribution is µ as well. The second set-valued mapping
Λ : Π → 2P(X) is defined as follows: for any π ∈ Π, the
state-measure µpi ∈ Λ(π) is the invariant distribution of the
transition probability P ( · |x, π(x), µpi); that is,
µpi( · ) =
∑
x∈X
P ( · |x, π(x), µpi)µpi(x).
Under Assumption 1 and Proposition 1, Λ(π) is always non-
empty.
We may now define the notion of equilibrium (called mean-
field equilibrium) for mean-field games using these mappings
Ψ, Λ as follows.
Definition 1. A pair (π∗, µ∗) ∈ Π × P(X) is a mean-field
equilibrium if π∗ ∈ Ψ(µ∗) and µ∗ ∈ Λ(π∗).
A. Regularized Mean-Field Games
A theory of regularized Markov decision processes (MDPs)
has been introduced in [27]. In this work, regularization is
introduced via subtracting a strongly convex function from
the one-stage reward function. This type of modifications is in
general applied to reinforcement learning algorithms to ensure
robust learners with improved exploration. We refer the reader
to [27] for comprehensive review on a variety of regularized
MDPs used in the literature.
Analogous to regularized MDPs, in this section, we intro-
duce regularized mean-field games. To that end, let Ω : U→ R
be a ρ-strongly convex function. Let Lreg be the Lipschitz
constant of Ω on U, whose existence is guaranteed by strong
convexity of Ω. The only difference between classical MFGs
and regularized ones is the regularization term in the one-stage
reward function. In regularized MFGs, the reward function is
given by
Rreg(x, u, µ) := R(x, u, µ)− Ω(u).
A typical example for Ω is the negative entropy Ω(u) =∑
a∈A ln(u(a))u(a). Another example is the relative en-
tropy between u and uniform distribution; that is, Ω(u) =∑
a∈A ln(u(a))u(a) + ln(|A|). In both of these examples, as
a result of entropy regularization, agent visits optimal and as
well as almost optimal actions more often and randomly. This
improves the exploration of the algorithm. Moreover, due to
strong convexity of Ω, Lipschitz sensitivity of the optimal
action on state, state-measure, and other uncertain parameters
can be established via Legendre-Fenchel duality. This makes
the learning algorithm more robust.
In regularized MFGs, for a fixed µ, the reward function of
any policy π is given by
J regµ (π) = E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtRreg(x(t), u(t), µ)
]
.
For this model, we define the set-valued mapping Ψreg :
P(X)→ 2Π as follows:
Ψreg(µ) = {πˆ ∈ Π : J regµ (πˆ) = sup
pi
J regµ (π) and µ0 = µ}.
Similarly, we define the set-valued mapping Λreg : Π →
2P(X) as follows: for any π ∈ Π, the state-measure µpi ∈
Λreg(π) is the invariant distribution of the transition probabil-
ity P ( · |x, π(x), µpi); that is,
µpi( · ) =
∑
x∈X
P ( · |x, π(x), µpi)µpi(x).
Then, the notion of equilibrium for this regularized game
model is defined as follows, which is similar to the definition
of mean-field equilibrium.
Definition 2. A pair (π∗, µ∗) ∈ Π × P(X) is a regularized
mean-field equilibrium if π∗ ∈ Ψreg(µ∗) and µ∗ ∈ Λreg(π∗).
In this paper, our goal is to develop a Q-learning algorithm
for computing an approximate regularized mean-field equilib-
rium when the model is unknown. To that end, we define the
following.
Definition 3. Let (π∗, µ∗) ∈ Π × P(X) be a regularized
mean-field equilibrium. A pair (πε, µ∗) ∈ Π × P(X) is an
ε-regularized-mean-field equilibrium if
J regµ∗ (πε) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
J regµ∗ (π) − ε = J regµ∗ (π∗)− ε;
that is, instead of optimality, we require that πε is ε-optimal.
With this definition, our goal now is to learn an ε-
regularized-mean-field equilibrium using Q-learning algo-
rithm.
B. Finite Agent Game
The regularized mean-field game model is indeed the
infinite-population limit of the regularized finite-agent game
model that will be described below. In finite-agent game
model, we have N -agents and, for each agent i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}, xNi (t) ∈ X and uNi (t) ∈ U denote the state and
the action of Agent i at time t, respectively. The empirical
distribution of the states of agents at time t is defined as
follows:
e
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(X).
This empirical distribution affects both the system dynamics
and one-stage reward function. Therefore, for each t ≥
0, next states (xN1 (t + 1), . . . , x
N
N (t + 1)) of agents have
the following conditional distribution given current states
(xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N (t)) and actions (u
N
1 (t), . . . , u
N
N(t)):
N∏
i=1
P
(
dxNi (t+ 1)
∣∣xNi (t), uNi (t), e(N)t ).
A policy π for a generic agent is a deterministic function from
X to U. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted by Πi. The
initial states xNi (0) are independent and identically distributed
according to µ0.
5Let pi(N) := (π1, . . . , πN ), πi ∈ Πi, denote an N -tuple of
policies. Under such an N -tuple of policies, the regularized
discounted reward of Agent i is defined as
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtRreg(xNi (t), u
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
.
Then, the goal of the agents is to achieve a Nash equilibrium,
which is defined as follows.
Definition 4. An N -tuple of policies pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗)
is a Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = sup
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi
(N∗)
−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
It is known that establishing the existence of Nash equilibria
and computing it are in general prohibitive for finite-agent
game model as a result of the decentralized nature of the
problem (see [22, pp. 4259]). Therefore, it is of interest to
obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium, whose definition is
given below.
Definition 5. An N -tuple of policies pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗)
constitutes an δ-Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) ≥ sup
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)− δ
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi(N∗)−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
Due to symmetry in mean-field game model, if the number
of agents is large enough, one can obtain approximate Nash
equilibrium by studying the infinite population limit N →∞
of the game (i.e., mean-field game). Indeed, one can prove
that if each agent in the finite-agent game model adopts the ε-
regularized-mean-field equilibrium policy, the resulting policy
will be an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently
large N -agent game models. Indeed, this is the statement of
the below theorem.
Theorem 1. Let (πε, µ∗) be an ε-regularized-mean-field equi-
librium. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a positive integer
N(ǫ), such that, for each N ≥ N(ǫ), the N -tuple of policies
pi
(N) = {πε, πε, . . . , πε} is an (ε + ǫ)-Nash equilibrium for
the game with N agents.
Proof. Note that we must prove that
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) ≥ sup
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)− ε− ǫ (1)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , when N is sufficiently large. As the
transition probabilities and the one-stage reward functions are
the same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove (1) for Agent 1
only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Π1 be such
that
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), πε, . . . , πε) > sup
pi′∈Π1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, πε, . . . , πε)− ǫ
3
.
Then, by [22, Corollary 4.11], we have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), πε, . . . , πε) = lim
N→∞
J reg
µ∗
(π˜(N))
≤ sup
pi′
J reg
µ∗
(π′)
≤ J reg
µ∗
(πε) + ε
= lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (πε, πε, . . . , πε) + ε.
Therefore, there exists N(ǫ) such that
sup
pi′∈Π1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, πε, . . . , πε)− ǫ− ε
≤ J (N)1 (π˜(N), πε, . . . , πε)−
2ǫ
3
− ε
≤ J reg
µ∗
(πε)− ǫ
3
≤ J (N)1 (πε, πε, . . . , πε).
for all N ≥ N(ǫ).
Theorem 1 states that if one can learn ε-regularized-mean-
field equilibrium, then the learned policy will be an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium for the finite-agent game problem,
where computing or learning the exact Nash equilibrium is
in general prohibitive.
In the next section, we will first introduce a mean-field
equilibrium (MFE) operator, which can be used to com-
pute mean-field equilibrium when the model is known, and
prove that this operator is contractive. Then, under model-free
setting, we approximate this MFE operator with a random
one and establish a learning algorithm. Using this random
operator, we obtain ε-regularized-mean-field equilibrium with
high confidence. This learned approximate regularized-mean-
field equilibrium can then be used in finite-agent game model
as an approximate Nash equilibrium.
III. MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIUM OPERATOR
In this section, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium
(MFE) operator, whose fixed point is a mean-field equilibrium.
We prove that this operator is contractive. Using this result, we
then establish a Q-learning algorithm to obtain approximate
regularized mean-field equilibrium. To that end, in addition
to Assumption 1, we assume the following. This assumption
ensures that the MFE operator is contractive. To state the
assumption, we need to define the constants below:
rmax := sup
(x,u,µ)∈X×U×P(X)
|Rreg(x, u, µ)|,
Qmax :=
rmax
1− β , QLip := L1 + Lreg + β QmaxK1.
Assumption 2. We assume that
3K1
2
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
L1 + β QmaxK1
1− β
)
< 1.
Given any state-measure µ, the regularized value function
J regµ of policy π with initial state x is defined as
J regµ (π, x) := E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtRreg(x(t), u(t), µ)
∣∣∣∣ x(0) = x
]
.
Then, the optimal regularized value function is given by
J reg,∗µ (x) := sup
pi∈Π
J regµ (π, x).
6Similarly, we define the optimal regularized Q-function as
Qreg,∗µ (x, u) = R
reg(x, u, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
J reg,∗µ (y)P (y|x, u, µ).
Note that Qreg,∗µ,max(x) := supu∈UQ
reg,∗
µ (x, u) = J
∗
µ(x) for all
x ∈ X. Therefore, we have the following optimality equation:
Qreg,∗µ (x, u) = R
reg(x, u, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µ)
=: HµQ
reg,∗
µ (x, u).
Here, it is known that Hµ is a ‖·‖∞-contraction with modulus
β and the unique fixed point of Hµ is Qreg,∗µ .
Let C denote the set of all Q-functions. We assume that any
Q ∈ C is uniformly QLip- Lipschitz continuous and ρ-strongly
concave with respect to u. For any Q ∈ C, the sup-norm is
defined as ‖Q‖∞ := sup(x,u)∈X×U |Q(x, u)|. In this paper, we
will always endow C with the sup-norm ‖ · ‖∞.
Now, we define the MFE operator. To that end, we define
H1 : P(X) → C as H1(µ) = Qreg,∗µ (optimal regularized
Q-function) and H2 : P(X)× C → P(X) as
H2(µ,Q)(·) :=
∑
x∈X
P (·|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x),
where fQ(x) = argmaxu∈UQ(x, u) for all x ∈ X. With
these definitions, we can give the definition of the optimality
operator as follows:
H : P(X) ∋ µ 7→ H2 (µ,H1(µ)) ∈ P(X).
Our goal is to prove that H is contractive. In the following
lemma, we prove that H1 is contractive, which will be used
to prove that H operator is also contractive.
Lemma 1. The mapping H1 is a contraction with contraction
constant KH1 :=
L1 + β QmaxK1
1− β .
Proof. Under Assumption 1, it is straightforward to prove that
H1 maps P(X) into C.
For any µ, µˆ ∈ P(X), we have
‖H1(µ)−H1(µˆ)‖∞ = ‖Qreg,∗µ −Qreg,∗µˆ ‖∞
= sup
x,u
∣∣∣∣R(x, u, µ) + β∑
y
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µ)
− R(x, u, µˆ)− β
∑
y
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ L1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1
+ β
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µ)−
∑
y
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣
+ β
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µˆ)−
∑
y
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ L1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1 + β QmaxK1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1 + β ‖Qreg,∗µ −Qreg,∗µˆ ‖∞.
This completes the proof.
Now, using Lemma 1, we can prove that H is contractive.
Proposition 2. The mapping H is a contraction with contrac-
tion constant KH , where
KH :=
3K1
2
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
KH1
)
.
Proof. For any µ ∈ P(X), we have
Qreg,∗µ (x, u) = HµQ
reg,∗
µ (x, u)
= R(x, u, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)P (y|x, u, µ)− Ω(u)
= 〈qµx , u〉 − Ω(u),
where
qµx(·) := r(x, ·, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
Qreg,∗µ,max(y) p(y|x, ·, µ).
As a result of this representation of Qreg,∗µ and ρ-strong
convexity of Ω, by [27, Proposition 1], Qreg,∗µ (x, ·) has a
unique minimizer fQreg,∗µ (x) ∈ U for any x ∈ X, and, for
any µ, µˆ ∈ P(X) and x, xˆ ∈ X, we have
‖fQreg,∗µ (x)− fQreg,∗µˆ (xˆ)‖2 ≤
1
ρ
‖qµx − qµˆxˆ‖2 ≤
1
ρ
‖qµx − qµˆxˆ‖1.
Note that we have
‖qµx − qµˆxˆ‖1
=
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣r(x, a, µ) + β∑
y∈X
Qreg,∗µ,max(y) p(y|x, a, µ)
− r(xˆ, a, µˆ)− β
∑
y∈X
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y) p(y|xˆ, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ L1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1)
+ β
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∑
y
Qreg,∗µ,max(y)p(y|x, a, µ)
−
∑
y
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y)p(y|x, a, µ)
∣∣∣∣
+ β
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∑
y
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y)p(y|x, a, µ)
−
∑
y
Qreg,∗µˆ,max(y)p(y|xˆ, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ L1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1) + β‖Qreg,∗µ −Qreg,∗µˆ ‖∞
+ βQmaxK1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1)
≤ (L1 + βQmaxK1)(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1) + βKH1‖µ− µˆ‖1
≤ KH1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1).
Therefore we obtain
‖fQreg,∗µ (x)− fQreg,∗µˆ (xˆ)‖2 ≤
1
ρ
KH1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1).
Since ‖v‖1 ≤
√
|A| ‖v‖2, we have
‖fQreg,∗µ (x)− fQreg,∗µˆ (xˆ)‖1
≤
√
|A|
ρ
KH1(1{x 6=xˆ} + ‖µ− µˆ‖1). (2)
7Now, fix any µ, µˆ ∈ P(X). Using (2), we have
‖H2(µ,H1(µ))−H2(µˆ, H1(µˆ))‖1
=
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗µ (x), µ), µ)µ(x)
−
∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ) µˆ(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗µ (x), µ)µ(x)
−
∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)µ(x)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)µ(x)
−
∑
x
P (y|x, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ) µˆ(x)
∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤
∑
x
∥∥∥P (·|x, fQreg,∗µ (x), µ) − P (·|x, fQreg,∗µˆ (x), µˆ)
∥∥∥
1
µ(x)
+
K1
2
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
KH1
)
‖µ− µˆ‖1
≤ K1
(
‖fQreg,∗µ (x)− fQreg,∗µˆ (x)‖ + ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
+
K1
2
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
KH1
)
‖µ− µˆ‖1
≤ 3K1
2
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
KH1
)
‖µ− µˆ‖1. (3)
Note that (2) and Proposition 1 lead to
‖P (·|x, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)− P (·|y, fQreg,∗
µˆ
(y), µˆ)‖1
≤ K1
(
1 +
√
|A|
ρ
KH1
)
. (4)
Hence, (1) follows from [34, Lemma A2]. This completes the
proof.
Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, H is a contraction
mapping. Therefore, by Banach Fixed Point Theorem, H has
an unique fixed point. Let µ∗ be this unique fixed point
and Qreg,∗µ∗ = H1(µ∗). Let π∗(x) = fQreg,∗µ∗ (x). Then, one
can prove that the pair (π∗, µ∗) is a regularized mean-field
equilibrium. Hence, we can compute this regularized mean-
field equilibrium via applying H recursively starting from
arbitrary µ0. This indeed leads to a value iteration algorithm
for computing mean-field equilibrium. However, if the model
is unknown, we replace H with a random operator and estab-
lish a learning algorithm via this random operator. To prove
the convergence of this learning algorithm, the contraction
property of H is crucial.
IV. Q-LEARNING ALGORITHM
In this section, we establish a learning algorithm for obtain-
ing approximate regularized mean-field equilibrium. In this
learning algorithm, we replace operators H1 and H2 with
random operators Hˆ1 and Hˆ2, respectively. Therefore, we
have two stages in each iteration of the learning algorithm.
In the first stage, the optimal regularized Q-function Qreg,∗µ
for a given µ is learned via fitted Q-learning algorithm, which
has been introduced in [26] to learn optimal Q-functions of
Markov decision processes. This stage replaces the operator
H1 with a random operator Hˆ1. In this fitted Q-learning
algorithm, Q-functions are picked from a fixed function class
F ⊂ C. This function class F can be chosen as the set of
neural networks with some fixed architecture or linear span of
some finite number of basis functions or the set C itself. De-
pending on F , an additional representation error in the learning
algorithm will be present. Let Fmax := {Qmax : Q ∈ F}.
In the second stage of each iteration, the state-measure is
updated via simulating corresponding transition probability.
This stage replaces the operator H2 with a random operator
Hˆ2. Below, we give the overall description of the algorithm
first, and then, the descriptions of Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 are given along
with their error analysis, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm H
Inputs
(
K, {[Nk, Lk]}Kk=0, {Mk}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
Start with µ0
for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 do
µk+1 = Hˆ ([Nk, Lk],Mk) (µk)
:= Hˆ2[Mk]
(
µk, Hˆ1[Nk, Lk](µk)
)
end for
return µK and QK = Hˆ1([NK , LK ])(µK)
We proceed by giving the description of Hˆ1 first. Let
ν be a probability measure on X. We fix some function
πb : X → P(U) such that, for any x ∈ X, the distribution
πb(x)(·) on U has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure
m. We denote this density with πb(x, u). We assume that
π0 := inf(x,u)∈X×U πb(x, u) > 0. Now, we can give the
definition of the random operator Hˆ1.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm Hˆ1
Inputs ([N,L], µ)
Start with Q0 = 0
for l = 0, . . . , L− 1 do
generate i.i.d. samples {(xt, ut, rt, yt+1)Nt=1} using
xt ∼ ν, ut ∼ πb(xt)(·), rt = Rreg(xt, ut, µ),
yt+1 ∼ P (·|xt, ut, µ)
and set
Ql+1 = argmin
f∈F
1
N
N∑
t=1
1
m(U)πb(xt, ut)
∣∣∣∣f(xt, ut)
−
[
rt + βmax
u′∈U
Ql(yt+1, u
′)
] ∣∣∣∣
2
end for
return QL
8Before we describe Hˆ2, the error analysis of algorithm
Hˆ1 is given. Note that there exists α > 0 such that for
any u ∈ U and ξ > 0, we have m (B(a, ξ) ∩ U) ≥
min {αm(B(a, ξ)),m(A)} , where m is the Lebesgue mea-
sure on U (when considered as a subset of R|A|−1) (see [35]).
To this end, we need to define the following constants:
E(F) := sup
µ∈P(X)
sup
Q∈F
inf
Q′∈F[∑
x
∫
U
|Q′(x, u)−HµQ(x, u)|2m(du)
m(U)
v(x)
]1/2
Lmax := (1 + β)Qmax + rmax, C :=
L2max
m(U)π0
Υ = 8 e2 (VF + 1) (VFmax + 1)
×
(
64eQmaxLmax(1 + β)
m(U)π0
)VF+VFmax
V = VF + VFmax , γ = 512C
2
∆ :=
1
1− β
[
m(U)|A|!
α(2/QLip)|A|−1
E(F)
] 1
dim
A
+1
Λ :=
1
1− β
[
m(U)|A|!
α(2/QLip)|A|−1
] 1
|A|
.
The following theorem gives the error analysis of the
algorithm Hˆ1.
Theorem 2. ( [25, Theorem 4.1]) For any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2, with
probability at least 1− δ, we have∥∥∥Hˆ1[N,L](µ)−H1(µ)∥∥∥
∞
≤ ε+∆
if β
L
1−β Qmax <
ε
2 and N ≥ m1(ǫ, δ, L), where
m1(ε, δ, L) :=
γ(2Λ)4|A|
ε4|A|
ln
(
Υ(2Λ)2V |A|L
δε2V |A|
)
.
Here, the constant error ∆ is as a result of the representation
error E(F) in the algorithm.
Next, we describe the random operator Hˆ2, and then, give
the error analysis.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm Hˆ2
Inputs (M,µ,Q)
for x ∈ X do
generate i.i.d. samples {yxt }Mt=1 using
yxt ∼ P (·|x, fQ(x), µ)
and define
PM (·|x, fQ(x), µ) = 1
M
M∑
t=1
δyxt (·).
end for
return
∑
x∈X PM (·|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x)
Theorem 3. ( [25, Theorem 4.2]) For any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2, with
probability at least 1− δ∥∥∥Hˆ2[M ](µ,Q)−H2(µ,Q)∥∥∥
1
≤ ε
if M ≥ m2(ǫ, δ), where
m2(ǫ, δ) :=
|X|2
ε2
ln
(
2 |X|2
δ
)
.
Using above error analyses of the algorithms Hˆ1 and Hˆ2, we
can now obtain the following error analysis for the algorithm
Hˆ . Then, the main result of this paper can be stated as a
corollary of this result.
Theorem 4. Fix any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2. Define
ε1 :=
(1−KH)2 ε2
16 θ (K1)2
, ε2 :=
(1−KH) ε
4
,
where θ :=
4
√
|A|
ρ . Let K,L be such that
(KH)
K
1−KH ≤
ε
2
,
βL
1− βQmax ≤
ε1
2
.
Then, pick N,M such that
N ≥ m1
(
ε1,
δ
2K
,L
)
, M ≥ m2
(
ε2,
δ
2K
)
. (5)
Let (µK , QK) be the output of the learning algorithm estab-
lished by random operator Hˆ with inputs(
K, {[N,L]}Kk=0, {M}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ
‖µK − µ∗‖1 ≤ K1
√
θ∆
(1−KH) + ε,
where µ∗ is the unique fixed point of H in regularized mean-
field equilibrium. Moreover, with probability at least 1− δ2K
‖QK −H1(µK)‖∞ ≤ ε1 +∆.
Proof. First of all, the last statement follows from Theorem 2.
To prove the first statement, note that for any µ ∈ P(X)
and Q, Qˆ ∈ C, we have
‖H2(µ,Q)−H2(µ, Qˆ)‖1
=
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
P (y|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x) −
∑
x∈X
P (y|x, fQˆ(x), µ)µ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈X
‖P (·|x, fQ(x), µ) − P (·|x, fQˆ(x), µ)‖1 µ(x)
≤
∑
x∈X
K1 ‖fQ(x) − fQˆ(x)‖1 µ(x). (6)
Suppose that Q is of the following form:
Q(x, u) = Rreg(x, u, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
v(y)P (y|x, u, µ)
= 〈qµ,vx , u〉 − Ω(u),
where v : X→ R and
qµ,vx (·) := r(x, ·, µ) + β
∑
y∈X
v(y) p(y|x, ·, µ).
Note that the mapping fQ(x) is the unique minimizer of
Q(x, ·) and fQˆ(x) is the unique minimizer of Qˆ(x, ·). Let
us set fQ(x) = u and fQˆ(x) = u
′. Then we have
Q(x, u)−Q(x, u′)
9= 〈qµ,vx , u〉 − Ω(u)− 〈qµ,vx , u′〉+Ω(u′)
= 〈qµ,vx , u− u′〉+Ω(u′)− Ω(u)
(1)
≥ 〈qµ,vx , u− u′〉+ 〈∇Ω(u), u′ − u〉+
ρ
2
‖u− u′‖22
= 〈∇Q(x, u), u− u′〉+ ρ
2
‖u− u′‖22
=
ρ
2
‖u− u′‖22,
where the last statement follows from the fact that u = fQ(x)
is the unique minimizer of differentiable concave function
Q(x, ·) (i.e., ∇Q(x, u) = 0) and (1) follows from strong
convexity of Ω [36, Definition 3.1]. Since ‖v‖1 ≤
√
|A|‖v‖2,
we have
‖fQ(x)− fQˆ(x)‖21 ≤
2
√
|A|
ρ
(
Q(x, fQ(x)) −Q(x, fQˆ(x))
)
=
2
√
|A|
ρ
(
Q(x, fQ(x)) − Qˆ(x, fQˆ(x))
+ Qˆ(x, fQˆ(x)) −Q(x, fQˆ(x))
)
=
2
√
|A|
ρ
(
max
u∈U
Q(x, u)−max
u∈U
Qˆ(x, u)
+ Qˆ(x, fQˆ(x)) −Q(x, fQˆ(x))
)
≤ 4
√
|A|
ρ
‖Q− Qˆ‖∞ =: θ ‖Q− Qˆ‖∞. (7)
Hence, combining (6) and (7) yields
‖H2(µ,Q)−H2(µ, Qˆ)‖1 ≤
√
θ K1
√
‖Q− Qˆ‖∞. (8)
Using (8), for any k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, we have
‖H(µk)− Hˆ([N,L],M)(µk)‖1
≤ ‖H2(µk, H1(µk))−H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1
+ ‖H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk)) − Hˆ2[M ](µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1
≤
√
θK1
√
‖H1(µk)− Hˆ1[N,L](µk)‖∞
+ ‖H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk)) − Hˆ2[M ](µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1.
The last term is bounded from above by
K1
√
θ(ε1 +∆) + ε2
with probability at least 1− δK by Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Therefore, with probability at least 1− δ
‖µK − µ∗‖1
≤
K−1∑
k=0
K
K−(k+1)
H ‖Hˆ([N,L],M)(µk)−H(µk)‖1
+ ‖HK(µ0)− µ∗‖1
≤
K−1∑
k=0
K
K−(k+1)
H
(
K1
√
θ(ε1 +∆) + ε2
)
+
(KH)
K
1−KH
≤ K1
√
θ∆
(1 −KH) + ε.
This completes the proof.
Now, we give the main result of this paper as a corollary of
Theorem 4. It states that, by using learning algorithm Hˆ , one
can obtain approximate regularized-mean-field equilibrium
with high confidence. Since approximate regularized mean-
field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium
for the finite-agent game model with sufficiently many agents,
this learning algorithm also provides approximate Nash equi-
librium.
Corollary 1. Fix any (ε, δ) ∈ (0, 1)2. Suppose that
K,L,N,M satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4. Let
(µK , QK) be the output of the learning algorithm established
by random operator Hˆ with inputs(
K, {[N,L]}Kk=0, {M}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
.
Define πK(x) := argmaxu∈UQK(x, u). Then, with probabil-
ity at least 1 − δ(1 + 12K ), the pair (πK , µ∗) is a κ(ε,∆)-
regularized mean-field equilibrium, where
κ(ε,∆)
= 2
1
1− β
(
(1−KH)2 ε2
16 θ (K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
K1
√
θ∆
(1−KH) + ε
))
.
Therefore, by Theorem 1, an N -tuple of policies π(N) =
{πK , πK , . . . , πK} is an κ(ε,∆)+ ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the
regularized game with N ≥ N(ǫ) agents.
Proof. By Theorem 4, with probability at least 1−δ(1+ 12K ),
we have
‖QK −H1(µ∗)‖∞
≤ ‖QK −H1(µK)‖∞ + ‖H1(µK)−H1(µ∗)‖∞
≤ ε1 +∆+KH1‖µK − µ∗‖1
≤ ε1 +∆+KH1
(
K1
√
θ∆
(1 −KH) + ε
)
=
(1 −KH)2 ε2
16 θ (K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
K1
√
θ∆
(1 −KH) + ε
)
.
Let πK(x) := argmaxu∈UQK(x, u). By [25, Proposition
3.2], with probability at least 1− δ(1 + 12K ), we have
‖J regµ∗ (π∗, ·)− J regµ∗ (πK , ·)‖∞
≤ 2 1
1− β
(
(1−KH)2 ε2
16 θ (K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
K1
√
θ∆
(1−KH) + ε
))
= κ(ε,∆).
Hence, (πK , µ∗) is κ(ε,∆)-mean-field equilibrium with prob-
ability at least 1− δ(1 + 12K ).
Remark 1. In Corollary 1, there is a constant error∆, which is
a function of representation error E(F). If we choose the class
of Q-functions F as C, then there will be no representation
error, i.e, E(F) = 0, and so, ∆ = 0. Hence, in this case, we
have the following error bound:
κ(ε, 0) := 2
1
1− β
(
(1−KH)2 ε2
16 θ (K1)2
+KH1ε
)
,
which goes to zero as ε→ 0.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established a learning algorithm
for discrete time regularized mean-field games subject to
discounted reward criterion via fitted Q-learning. It is known,
at least heuristically and experimentally, that adding regu-
larization term to the one-stage reward function makes the
learning algorithm more robust and improves exploration. In
addition to these advantages, with regularization term, the error
analysis of the learning algorithm has been established under
milder assumptions compared to the classical version of the
game model.
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